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TAKEN FOR A RIDE: WORKERS IN THE GIG ECONOMY 
In R. (on the application of The Independent Workers Union of Great Britain) v Central 
Arbitration Committee and Roofoods Ltd t/a Deliveroo [2018] EWHC 3342 (Admin); [2018] 
12 WLUK 17, Supperstone J. considered a judicial review challenge by the Union (IWGB) to 
a decision of the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) that Deliveroo Riders were not 
“workers”. The CAC had held that there was a valid and unfettered substitution clause in the 
contract, the effect of which was to negate “worker” status as defined in s.296(1)(b) Trade 
Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA) (Independent Workers’ 
Union of Great Britain v RooFoods Ltd t/a Deliveroo [2017] 11 WLUK 313; [2018] I.R.L.R. 
84). This meant that the statutory recognition procedure in Sch.A1 of TULRCA was 
inapplicable to them since it is restricted to “workers”. Permission for the legal challenge was 
granted by Simler J. on the basis of art.11 of the ECHR and its protection of the fundamental 
right to collective bargaining (Demir and Baykara v Turkey (2009) 48 E.H.R.R. 54; [2009] 
I.R.L.R. 766). The IWGB argued that since Sch.A1 was the legislative specification of the 
fundamental right to collective bargaining, protected under art.11, its personal scope ought to 
be construed in favour of inclusion of the Riders. This followed from s.3 of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 which provides that:  
       “so far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be  
       read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights”. 
    Supperstone J. rejected IWGB.’s argument on the principal basis that the case law of the 
ECtHR restricted trade union rights in art.11 to those in an “employment relationship”. These 
specific trade union rights did not extend to “everyone”, as is the case with the general 
protection of freedom of association in art.11. Since the Riders were not workers in national 
law, Supperstone J. concluded that they were not in an “employment relationship” either. Given 
his reading of the ECtHR’s case law, this treatment of their decisions appeared to be consistent 
with Pinnock v Manchester City Council [2010] UKSC 45; [2011] 2 A.C. 104 where Lord 
Neuberger observed (at [48]) that:  
       “Where there is a clear and constant line of decisions whose effect is not inconsistent with  
       some fundamental substantive or procedural aspect of our law, and whose reasoning does  
       not appear to overlook or misunderstand some argument or point of principle, we consider  
       that it would be wrong for this court not to follow that line”  
Given his primary finding that there was no interference with the Riders’ art.11 rights, the 
remaining points were quickly disposed of. Supperstone J. took the view that any restriction of 
the Riders’ art.11 rights would be easily justified under art.11(2), and he rejected a range of 
proposed reformulations of the personal work criterion under s.296(1)(b) TULRCA 1992. 
    Supperstone J.s judgment is erroneous in two respects. First, the judgment misapplies the 
“employment relationship” concept under art.11 because the Riders clearly fall within its 
scope. Secondly, the judgment applies a very broad margin of appreciation in its art.11 
reasoning. This is mistaken. The interference with the Riders’ freedom of association is very 
far-reaching, because worker status in UK law is the gateway to the most basic freedom of 
association protections. The note concludes by proposing an interpretation of the “personal 
work” requirement in “worker” that is consistent with “employment relationship” under art. 
11. 
    Supperstone J. treated the Grand Chamber decision in Sindicatul “Pastorul Cel Bun” v 
Romania [2014] 58 E.H.R.R. 10; [2014] I.R.L.R. 49 as supporting Deliveroo’s argument that 
there was no interference with the Riders’ art.11 rights. According to Supperstone J. this was 
because there was no “employment relationship” between Deliveroo and its Riders (at [38]). 
The Grand Chamber in Sindicatul “Pastorul Cel Bun” had held that such a relationship was 
necessary for “the right to form a trade union within the meaning of art 11” (at [141]). The 
Grand Chamber referred to “the criteria laid down in the relevant international instruments” 
and in particular the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Employment Relationship 
Recommendation, 2006 (No.198) (at [142]). 
    There are unresolved ambiguities about the scope of freedom of association in international 
law, particularly the interrelationship between ILO and ECHR standards. The ILO supervisory 
committees have treated freedom of association as applying to all workers “without distinction 
whatsoever” (ILO Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise Convention, 1948 (No.87)), and this would include the self-employed (B. Creighton 
and S. McCrystal (2016) 37 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 691 at 701). By contrast, the ILO 
Recommendation relied upon by the Grand Chamber is focused more narrowly on contexts of 
“disguised employment” (see (2016) 37 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 691 at 716) 
    In applying art.11, therefore, it is better to treat the narrower ILO concept of “employment 
relationship” as applicable to the Riders’ contractual situation, rather than the wider argument 
that the right to collective bargaining applies to “everyone”, including independent 
entrepreneurs. That wider argument would represent a much more fundamental challenge to 
the legal structure of collective labour law in the UK, which is centred on the “worker”. It is a 
more modest step to secure an alignment of “worker” with the concept of “employment 
relationship”. 
    The application of the criteria in the Recommendation to the Riders’ situation leads 
ineluctably to the conclusion that they are in an “employment relationship”. At first blush, the 
concern of the Recommendation with “disguised employment” might appear to limit its 
relevance to Deliveroo. The CAC had already decided that the substitution clauses were 
genuine and not a sham. Nevertheless, the Recommendation in its Preamble also recognises 
that there might be “difficulties of establishing whether an employment relationship 
exists…where inadequacies or limitations exist in the legal framework, or in its interpretation 
or application”. A legal rule that treats the mere existence of a valid contractual term (such as 
a substitution clause) as a conclusive negation of worker status is defective in precisely this 
respect. It is tantamount to permitting contracting-out of employment protection. To counter 
this “inadequacy or limitation”, it is necessary to develop the law on personal work in a   
purposive way. 
    Under Part II, the determination of an “employment relationship” should be:  
       “guided primarily by the facts relating to the performance of work … notwithstanding how  
       the relationship is characterized in any contrary arrangement, contractual or otherwise, that  
       may have been agreed between the parties” (para.9).  
It also recommends “allowing a broad range of means for determining the existence of an 
employment relationship”; and where there is a “relevant indicator” present in the factual 
arrangements there should be a “legal presumption that an employment relationship exists” 
(para.11). These relevant indicators:  
       “might include: (a) the fact that the work: is carried out according to the instructions and  
       under the control of another party; involves the integration of the worker in the  
       organization of the enterprise; is performed solely or mainly for the benefit of another  
       person; must be carried out personally by the worker … involves the provision of tools,  
       materials and machinery by the party requesting the work” (para.13). 
    In Deliveroo the existence of an apparently unfettered substitution clause was treated as fatal 
to worker status. This is incompatible with para.13. Its effect was to characterise the Riders as 
self-employed despite the existence of other indicative factors, such as the provision of 
extensive training to new recruits (Independent Workers’ Union of Great Britain v RooFoods 
Ltd t/a Deliveroo [2018] I.R.L.R. 84 at [46]-[47]), pointing the other way. As the CAC Panel 
stated, once the finding of a valid substitution clause had been made:  
       “it is therefore unnecessary to dissect the other features of the contractual relationship  
       between Deliveroo and its Riders: they are insufficient to compensate in the Union’s  
       favour in light of the substitution finding.” (at [103]).  
Nor was there any “legal presumption that an employment relationship exists” as required by 
the Recommendation. The arrangements were construed neutrally rather than in a pro-
inclusionary way favouring worker status. Properly understood, the Riders were in an 
“employment relationship” for the purposes of art.11. 
    The second problem concerns Supperstone J.’s conclusion that the justification for any 
interference with art.11 (1) was easily met:  
       “Any interference with Art.11(1) is of a limited nature. The personal service obligation  
       does not prevent Riders from belonging to the Union if they choose to do so, or prevent  
       the making of voluntary arrangements. All that it precludes is the compulsory mechanism  
       provided by Schedule A1 of the 1992 Act” (at [46]).  
The assumed existence of alternative means for the Riders to organise for the protection of 
their interests provided support for a wide margin of appreciation. This assumption permeates 
Supperstone J.’s entire judgment. 
    Supperstone J.’s generous approach to margin of appreciation implies an equivalence with 
decisions such as Pharmacists’ Defence Association Union v Boots Management Services 
[2017] EWCA Civ 66; [2017] 2 WLUK 283 and Unite the Union v UK (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 
SE7; [2017] I.R.L.R. 438. In these cases, the courts emphasised that legislators enjoyed a wide 
latitude to concretise the right to collective bargaining in legislation. It was necessary for courts 
to proceed cautiously before disrupting the complex social and economic adjustments that 
underlie such legislation. This is a pre-eminently political domain in which courts should tread 
lightly. In Boots, the workers had the opportunity to seek statutory derecognition of the 
recognised non-independent staff association, enabling the independent union to seek 
recognition under Sch.A1 in the event of a successful derecognition ballot. In Unite, the 
abolition of the Agricultural Wages Board did not violate art.11. This finding was supported 
by the fact that the agricultural workers still enjoyed formal access to Sch.A1 (though they 
faced serious practical obstacles in that regard because most employers fell below the Sch.A1 
threshold that an employer must employ at least 21 workers) and could pursue collective 
bargaining through voluntary means, including strike action (see [2017] I.R.L.R. 438 at [65]). 
In other words, the legal regime provided opportunities for these workers to organise and seek 
collective bargaining, despite the existence of specific impediments in each case. 
    By contrast, Supperstone J.’s conclusion that the Riders are not workers has extreme 
implications for their freedom of association. The logic of Supperstone J.’s analysis is that the 
Riders are now legally unprotected from discrimination because of their trade union 
membership and activities; any collective agreements may be exposed to liability under 
competition law; and trade unions organising strike action of self-employed Riders cannot 
benefit from the trade dispute immunity under s.219 TULRCA 1992. Far from being an 
interference “of a limited nature”, the denial of worker status represents a complete negation 
of their freedom of association. 
    According to Supperstone J. the Riders are not prevented “from belonging to the Union if 
they choose to do so.” That is a surprising assertion because the structure of legal protection 
for freedom of association under the 1992 Act is focused on “workers”. “Workers” are 
protected from being subject to a “detriment” (s.146) and financial inducements by their 
employer (s.145A) where the sole or main purpose is to prevent or deter them from being trade 
union members, using union services, or taking part in the activities of a union at an appropriate 
time. “Workers” are also protected in certain circumstances from “offers” where the 
employer’s “sole or main purpose” is that the worker’s terms will no longer be determined by 
collective agreement (s.145B). Refusal of employment (s.137) and dismissal (s.152) in relation 
to trade union membership, use of union services, and taking part in the activities of a union at 
an appropriate time, is restricted to “employees”. The Riders may also be legally unprotected 
from blacklisting. Under the Employment Relations Act 1999 (Blacklists) Regulations 2010 a 
“prohibited list” must be:  
       “compiled with a view to being used by employers or employment agencies for the  
       purposes of discrimination in relation to recruitment or in relation to the treatment of  
       workers” (reg.3(2)(b), emphasis added).  
After Deliveroo, anti-union discrimination can be perpetrated against self-employed Riders 
with legal impunity.  
    In these circumstances:  
       “their freedom to belong to a trade union, for the protection of their interests, becomes  
       illusory. It is the role of the State to ensure that trade union members are not prevented or  
       restrained from using their union to represent them in attempts to regulate their relations  
       with employers.” (Wilson v UK (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 20; [2002] I.R.L.R. 568 at [46]).  
Without these minimal legal protections, the very foundations of the right to collective 
bargaining are removed. It is “a very far-reaching interference with freedom of association” 
(Unite the Union v UK [2017] I.R.L.R. 438 at [60]) which should, like the interference in 
Demir, be subject to a very narrow margin of appreciation. 
    Supperstone J. also stated that the exclusion of worker status did not prevent the Riders from 
“the making of voluntary arrangements”. This betrays a basic failure to understand the anti-
competitive nature of collective agreements. Under EU law, collective agreements between 
organisations representing employees and employers are exempted from art.101 (1) TFEU 
where those agreements are directed at improving conditions of work and employment (Albany 
International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie (C-67/96) EU:C:1999:430; 
[1999] E.C.R I-05751 (Grand Chamber)). By contrast, where agreements relate to the work 
conditions of the self-employed, a representative organisation is exposed to liability under 
competition law because it is functioning as an association of “undertakings”. In FNV Kunsten 
Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden (C-413/13) EU:C:2014:2411; [2015] All E.R. 
(EC) 387) the ECJ held that the exclusion from art.101 (1) TFEU could be extended where the 
individuals were “false self-employed” (at [31]). That court enumerated various criteria for 
determining whether the individuals were in a disguised employment relationship, such as the 
degree of control and subordination. Where independence is “merely notional” (at [35]), this 
will lead to a characterisation of “worker” in EU law. The Riders in Deliveroo are likely to be 
“false self-employed” in EU law (though that cannot be said definitively). If they are workers 
in EU law, thereby insulating their collective agreements from competition law restrictions, it 
would be better for the courts to bring the domestic law on worker into alignment in the 
interests of legal certainty. 
    Finally, the organisation of strike action undertaken by Riders may expose trade unions to 
liabilities in tort. Where organisers of strike action commit certain listed economic torts, it is 
possible to claim a “trade dispute defence” under TULRCA 1992. The scope of this defence is 
limited to “a dispute between workers and their employer” (s.244 TULRCA 1992). If Riders 
are not workers, any dispute with Deliveroo is incapable of being a “trade dispute”. Admittedly, 
in the context of casualised contracting where there is no obligation to undertake work, the 
scope for the tort of inducing breach of contract is diminished. Of course, it is not fanciful to 
anticipate that the employer’s presentation of its contractual arrangements will be sensitive to 
the legal context. There was no conclusive finding on “mutuality of obligation” in Deliveroo, 
and it may be that the “true agreement” in a strike injunction case is that there are continuing 
contractual obligations, leading to potential liability for the tort of inducing breach of contract. 
There are also ambiguities around the torts of conspiracy to injure and the parameters of 
“unlawful means” sufficient to leave trade unions exposed to injunctions and uncertain 
common law liabilities. (See, e.g., ‘Union drops support for DPD courier walkout after legal 
threat’ https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/nov/22/gmb-union-drops-support-for-
dpd-courier-walkout-after-legal-threat).  
    Section 296(1)(b) provides that X is a worker where he is employed:  
       “under any other contract whereby he undertakes to do or perform personally any work or  
       services for another party to the contract who is not a professional client of his” (emphasis  
       added).  
In interpreting this provision in accordance with art.11, three points should be borne in mind. 
First, the ILO Recommendation supports the Employment Appeal Tribunal’s approach in Uber 
that the tribunal should examine “all the circumstances” in determining the “true agreement” 
(Uber B. v Aslam [2017] 11 WLUK 238; [2018] R.T.R. 14 at [105]). Secondly, where any of 
those indicative elements point towards the existence of an employment relationship, the 
“purposive” approach in Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] UKSC 41; [2011] 4 All E.R. 745 
should be applied. “Purposive” must be interpreted in accordance with the ILO 
Recommendation. Where it is possible to characterize X as a worker on a reasonable 
construction of the working arrangements, X should be characterized as such (see further A. 
Bogg (2018) 81 M.L. R. 509). In effect, this equates “purposive” with a “legal presumption” 
of employment relationship, as required by the Recommendation. Thirdly, where a 
fundamental human right is at stake, such as the right to collective bargaining, the purposive 
approach should be applied strongly in favour of inclusion (see V.D. Stefano and A. Aloisi, 
Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper No. 3125866, 28 February 2018). 
    Treating a valid substitution clause as a ‘term inconsistent’ with employment status is, in the 
words of the Recommendation, an example of an “inadequacy or limitation” in the legal 
framework. It is incumbent on a court to interpret and apply the legal tests as favourably as 
possible to the worker. Even on a conventional view of substitution clauses, the evidence did 
not support the conclusion that there was a wholly unfettered substitution clause in Deliveroo. 
The contract stipulated restrictions on the identity of the substitute: the Rider could not just 
send anyone. (Independent Workers’ Union of Great Britain v RooFoods Ltd t/a Deliveroo 
[2018] I.R.L.R. 84 at [59]). This positions the Deliveroo substitution clause closer to those in 
Macfarlane v Glasgow CC [2000] 5 WLUK 461; [2001] I.R.L.R. 7 and Pimlico Plumbers v 
Smith [2018] UKSC 29; [2018] 4 All E.R. 641, where the substitution clauses were held not to 
negate personal work, in part because the identity of the substitute was restricted under each 
contract. 
    In conclusion, how should courts interpret the personal work requirement under s.296(1)(b)? 
The radical strategy would be to excise “personally” from the statutory definition. The effect 
of this would be to relegate personal work to a relevant factor in deciding whether the other 
party to the contract is a “professional client” (or customer). Substitution clauses would no 
longer function as “terms inconsistent” with worker status. A less radical strategy would be 
simply to interpret the current words in a more purposive way. Let it be recalled that the worker 
must undertake to “perform personally any work or services”. It is not decisive that a Rider 
might opt at their discretion to send substitutes frequently or even once an assignment had been 
commenced. The relevant question is: would it have been within the reasonable contemplation 
of the contracting parties that the appointed Rider would never do any delivery personally 
during the working relationship with Deliveroo? The answer, of course, is no. If that is so, the 
Rider should be treated as meeting the personal service requirement under section 296(1)(b) 
for they have plainly undertaken to do at least some work personally. Either approach would 
bring the law on freedom of association back into alignment with art.11 ECHR. In so doing it 
would rectify a serious injustice against the precarious “self-employed” in the Gig economy. 
                                                                                      Alan Bogg  
                                                                           Professor of Labour Law, University of Bristol 
 
